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Cultural differences are real and arresting. They are noted, discussed and debated in 
bioethics, as in contemporary social and political life in general. But cultural differences can 
be very tricky to interpret. Their factual status, moral meanings and political implications 
are rarely, if ever, as straightforward as they appear. Cultural differences can be seriously 
misconceived, misinterpreted, misrepresented and misused in various ways. Empirically 
problematic perceptions, ethically dubious judgments, and practically contentious 
resolutions can easily become entangled when considering matters of cultural difference. 
Many works on cross-cultural bioethics have often merely served to reinforce deeply rooted 
stereotypes and myths regarding both Western and non-Western cultures, especially the 
latter. A glaring example of such confusion is the appeal to perceived cultural differences as 
an ethical justification for rejecting those norms perceived as originating in the West and 
strongly advocated there – such as truth-telling by medical professionals, informed consent, 
patients’ rights, women’s rights and human rights in general. It is argued and widely held in 
certain circles that such practices and values are irrelevant and inapplicable to non-Western 
societies and cultures.   
In this paper, I will critically examine  “the cultural differences” argument as it has been 
formulated against medical truth-telling in the Chinese context. I will demonstrate that, 
despite its popularity and apparent plausibility, the argument is seriously flawed both 
descriptively and normatively. Elsewhere, through comparisons between China and the 
West and supported by extensive primary Chinese materials, I have shown that direct 
disclosure is far from culturally alien to China and that, on the contrary, there was once a 
long, though forgotten, tradition of medical truth-telling in China (Nie 2011: Chapter 6). 
Here, I argue that, even if medical truth-telling were culturally alien to China, as usually 
assumed, ethical imperatives exist to reform the contemporary mainstream Chinese practice 
of nondisclosure or indirect disclosure through family members. Moreover, I will offer a 
Confucian defence of truth-telling as a fundamental ethical principle and a cardinal personal 
and social virtue which physicians would do well to take seriously. In the process, I expose 
some common intellectual barriers to cross-cultural understanding: dichotomizing different 
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cultures as “radical others” to one another, promoting the tyranny of existing cultural 
practices, and obscuring the real ethical issues at stake. To put the matter positively, I seek 
to present the elements of a more adequate cross-cultural bioethics or a “transcultural 
bioethics” – an ethics that resists cultural stereotypes, upholds the primacy of morality, and 
acknowledges the richness, openness and internal heterogeneity of medical ethics in every 
culture, whether in China or elsewhere.    
2. The “cultural differences” argument     
It is known far and wide that, in sharp contrast to most Western countries where 
truthfulness constitutes an essential, even legally required, element of good medical 
practice, medical professionals in contemporary China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan) 
customarily withhold from patients crucial information about terminal illnesses such as 
cancer. Any information given out is usually restricted to family members only, and is often 
given in an overtly paternalist manner (e.g., Kleinman 1988: 152, Li and Chou 1997, Pang 
1998, 1999, Tse, Chong and Fob 2003, Fan and Li 2004, Tang and Lee 2004, Zhu 2005, Zeng, 
Li, Chen and Fang 2007, Tang et al. 2008).  
This situation is not restricted to China. Nondisclosure or indirect disclosure through family 
members is the mainstream practice in other Asian countries such as Japan and Nepal, as 
well as in other parts of the world such as the Middle East and Eastern and Southern Europe 
(e.g. Surbone 1992, Mitsuya 1997, Gongal et al. 2006, Mobereek et al 2008). In different 
countries or within different ethnic groups within the same country, patients suffering from 
cancer and other terminal illnesses receive very different levels of information about their 
diagnosis, prognosis, and therapeutic options (e.g. Macklin 1999, Mitchell 1998, Mystakidou 
et al. 2004, Tuckett 2004, Hancock et al. 2007, Surbone 2006, 2008). As the title of an editorial 
by an Italian physician in the journal Support Care Cancer characterizes it, there is a 
“persisting difference in truth telling throughout the world” (Surbone 2004). 
According to more recent literature, although “there is a shift in truth-telling attitudes and 
practice toward greater disclosure of diagnosis to cancer patients worldwide”, “partial and 
nondisclosure is still common in many cultures that are centered on family and community 
values” (Surbone 2008, 237). Thus this striking cultural difference—direct disclosure in most 
Western countries vs. non-disclosure or indirect disclosure in most non-Western societies—
is still prevalent in the twenty-first century.  
It is from acknowledging this cultural divide that the “cultural differences” view, that 
opposes medical truth-telling in non-Western societies like China, has taken root. Two 
Chinese medical ethicists put the issue succinctly: “In contrast [with the West], Chinese 
medical ethics, even today, in theory and in practice, remains committed to hiding the truth 
as well as to lying when necessary to achieve the family’s view of the best interests of the 
patient” (Fan and Li 2004, 180). Direct truth-telling – the so-called “Western individualistic 
mode” – is defined as being culturally alien to China and therefore morally unsound 
because it violates so-called “Chinese familial values”.  
In Japan, similar arguments have been put forward to reject medical truth-telling and 
replace it by a family-centered style of informed consent. A major rationale behind the 
distinction holds that the construal of the self in Japanese and Western culture is to be 
defined as “interdependent vs. independent” respectively, or, to put it another way, in 
terms of the family vs. the individual (Akabayashi and Slingsby 2006).   
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The cultural differences argument against medical truth-telling can take a number of 
different forms. In the Chinese context, one common argument, in the form of a syllogism, 
goes like this:   
Major premise: Different cultural norms and practices ought to be respected and maintained;  
Minor premise: In contrast to the Western practice of direct disclosure regarding terminal 
illness, the cultural norm in China is nondisclosure or indirect disclosure through family 
members; 
Conclusion: Therefore, medical professionals should refrain from telling Chinese patients the 
truth about their terminal illness. 
A more sophistical version of the argument goes thus:  
First premise: Different cultural norms and practices ought to be respected and maintained;  
Second premise: Chinese and Western cultures are fundamentally and radically different from 
each other; 
Third premise: Truth-telling is the Western cultural norm and is founded on individualistic 
Western culture; 
Fourth premise: Nondisclosure or indirect disclosure through family members is the Chinese 
cultural norm and is founded on family-oriented Chinese culture;  
Conclusion: Therefore, nondisclosure or indirect disclosure through family members should 
be maintained and the practice of medical truth-telling rejected in China.    
Whatever form it takes, the cultural differences argument consists of two core claims—one 
descriptive and the other normative. The empirical or descriptive claim generalizes secrecy 
and lying to the sick and dying as the representative and authentic cultural norm for 
Chinese. The normative claim insists the practice of nondisclosure should be maintained in 
order to respect perceived cultural differences. The descriptive claim is more widely held 
than the normative one: those who subscribe to the normative claim always found their 
position on the descriptive claim. Yet, those who accept the descriptive claim do not 
necessarily agree with the normative claim; they are thus free to take an ethical position 
against nondisclosure or indirect disclosure.   
3. The current debate in China   
Defying its contemporary stereotype as a monolithic, changeless nation or (in the famous 
metaphor of Napoleon) a “sleeping lion”, China has always been in a state of flux. In the 
past three or so decades – a period designated by the Chinese authorities as one of  
“reform and openness” – the enormous social and economic transformations undergone 
by China have had a profound impact on the history of both China and the world. On the 
medical front, the patient-physician relationship, including the handling of medical 
information relating to incurable and terminal diseases, has undergone a comparable 
“revolution”. In the 1980s when I was a medical student and intern in China, it was 
standard practice that patients were never told directly about their terminal illness. We 
were instructed to conceal such a diagnosis and even lie to the sick and dying – for 
instance, not to write the Chinese character for cancer, ai, on the patient’s card, but the 
English abbreviation Ca. This cloak of secrecy surrounding the terminally ill was (and still 
is) referred to by a special quasi-medical term – “protective medical treatment” (baohuxing 
yiliao).  
Since the 1990s and especially the early 2000s, however, the practice of withholding 
crucial medical information has been challenged by patients, medical professionals, and 
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the general public. An historic change is happening in China, a shift from secrecy and 
lying toward honest and direct disclosure. In 2008, thirteen hospitals throughout China 
and the premier Chinese journal Medicine and Philosophy jointly issued a series of 
documents on informed consent (Yixue Yu Zhexu 2008, 1-12). One of them is entitled 
“Guiding Principles on Truth-telling to and Consent from Cancer Patients”. While it 
promotes only partial disclosure and insists on the necessity of “appropriate 
confidentiality” (ibid, 7-8), this document indicates that the Chinese debate on the issue 
has subtly shifted from whether patients should be told about their condition to when and 
how they should be best informed.  
In many ways, the Chinese debate closely resembles the Western debate of the 1960s and 
1970s. As a matter of course, advocates of honest and direct disclosure take up the language 
of rights – the right of the patient to know and decide. They also call attention to the damage 
done by secrecy and concealing the truth from patients, as well as the benefits of honest 
communication for both patients and physicians. On the other side of the debate, defenders 
of nondisclosure, especially medical professionals and family members, emphasize the duty 
to protect patients and, at least, to avoid doing harm. It is assumed that the communication 
of complex and negative medical information is bad for patients’ morale, if not beyond their 
intelligence. It has often been asserted, not only in the mass media but also in the medical 
and academic literature, that telling the truth about terminal illness frightens and depresses 
patients, deprives them of hope, and may even shorten their lives. It has been circulated that 
young women are more vulnerable than other groups and are more likely to commit suicide 
after learning of a negative prognosis.  
The Chinese debate differs in one salient area from that conducted in the West several 
decades ago: the issue of cultural differences. A common argument invoked to oppose 
medical truth-telling in China lies in the appeal to cultural differences, in particular to 
Chinese values and cultural context. Indeed, the invoking of the cultural argument raises a 
number of questions regarding the current Chinese trend to honest and open disclosure. Is 
this new development merely an aping of the contemporary Western norm? Is it a 
consequence of Western cultural hegemony or even of bioethical imperialism? More 
fundamentally, is this current shift in attitudes merely a change of fashion or is it based on 
sound moral foundations? If the cultural differences argument against medical truth-telling 
in China is valid, then current efforts to reform the still widespread practice of secrecy and 
lying to the sick and dying are heading in the wrong direction. 
But the argument against this reform is seriously flawed. In what follows, I reveal and 
discuss a number of empirical and normative problems with this argument, however 
appealing it may be on the surface.    
4. Dicthotomizing east and west 
The cultural differences argument is anchored in and perpetuates a deeply rooted and still 
prevalent habit of thought: the dichotomizing of the West and the non-West as “radical 
others” to one another (for a critical examination of what can be called the “fallacy of 
dichotomizing cultures,” see Nie 2011, especially Chapters 1 and 2). In bioethics, this 
polarization of East and West is manifested in the popular but specious idea of “Western 
individualist bioethics” vs. “Asian communitarian bioethics” (Nie 2007). According to this 
way of thinking, the dominant practice or official position of a given culture or social 
group is deemed the authentic representative of the culture or social group concerned. 
And the differences between and among cultures are perceived to be radical, 
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fundamental, and largely incompatible with each other. As a result, the actual richness 
and great internal plurality of a given culture and the complexity of cultural differences 
within and between different groups are oversimplified and all too often seriously 
distorted.   
Drawing on and perpetuating this cultural dichotomy, the cultural differences argument 
against medical truth-telling in the Chinese context has crudely distorted the historical and 
socio-cultural realities of both China and the West. As the first part of my comparative study 
of medical truth-telling has uncovered (Nie 2011, Chapter 6), historically speaking, it is 
simply incorrect to claim that truth-telling is the representative Western cultural norm while 
it is culturally alien to China. Far from being an age-old cultural tradition, in the West 
medical truth-telling did not become the accepted standard until the 1970s or even later – it 
has a history of a few decades only. And, on the other side, totally contrary to what has been 
universally assumed and presented both inside and outside China, the traditional practice 
and norm of Chinese culture and medical ethics was for physicians to disclose their 
diagnosis and prognosis of terminal illness truthfully and directly to patients. A great deal 
of primary historical material, including the biographies of ancient medical sages and 
hundreds of celebrated physicians in different dynasties (Chen 1991[1723]), reveals a well-
established Chinese tradition of medical truth-telling that dates back at least twenty-six 
centuries. Ironically, the contemporary mainstream Chinese practice of nondisclosure as a 
“historical” phenomenon has a great deal to do with an older Western norm of concealing 
medical information. 
5. Chinese patients want to know the truth 
Sociologically, the cultural differences view has assumed that Chinese patients are not only 
kept in ignorance of their condition, but even prefer things this way. However, in total 
contrast to this assumption, the great majority of Chinese people, like Westerners, want to 
know the truth about their medical condition if suffering from serious illness.  
In a telephone survey of 2674 Chinese households conducted in Hong Kong in 1995, 95% of 
1138 interviewees aged between 18 and 65 indicated that they would prefer knowing their 
medical diagnosis, even if the outlook was grave. The same proportion said they would 
object if their family only was informed, while they themselves were not told. And 97% of 
respondents would want to know their prognosis. The researchers concluded that the 
patterns of preference shown by Chinese people in Hong Kong were “very similar to those 
reported in studies on Western populations” (Fielding and Hung 1996). Taiwanese cancer 
patients also expressed a strong preference for medical professionals to tell them the truth, 
even before informing relatives (Tang and Lee 2004).   
The same is true of mainland Chinese.  In the early 2000s, speaking to a class of about 60 
students, mostly postgraduates, in one of the leading ethics programs in China (in Hunan 
Normal University located in Changsha, a central southern Chinese city), I asked if they 
would like to know the truth if they were diagnosed with a terminal illness. A large majority 
responded “yes” (about 50), and only a handful said “no”. 
Despite some deficiencies in sample selections and research design, many extensive surveys 
conducted throughout mainland China clearly indicate the preference of the great (or even 
overwhelming) majority of Chinese patients suffering from terminal illness to be fully 
apprised of the medical facts about their condition. A survey of 311 cancer patients in 
Guangzhou in southeast China found that 72.99% believed that patients should be fully 
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informed; 24.12% responded that the decision should depend on the wishes of the patients 
themselves; and only 2.89% thought that patients should not be told about their cancer 
diagnosis (Huang, Wang, Zhang, Lü and Li 2001). In a survey conducted in Shenyang, 
northeast China, involving 198 hospitalized elderly cancer patients and 312 family members, 
94% of patients and 82.7% of family members considered it essential for the truth to be told 
about their terminal illness, and 97% of patients and 90.4% of family members believed that 
the sharing of accurate medical information would improve the outcomes of treatment (Gao, 
Zou and Yang 2006). Another survey of 302 cancer patients in Wuhan, central South China, 
concluded that, in general, cancer patients are very keen to know the truth about their 
illness and that the practice of “protective treatment” had resulted in distrust of medical 
professionals and increased concerns about the seriousness of their condition (Zeng, Zhou, 
Hong, Xiang, and Fang 2008).  
However, the cultural difference view is  accurate on one point – in China, most medical 
professionals and the majority of family members are unwilling to inform patients truthfully 
(see the survey results presented below). Interestingly, when they were asked whether or 
not they would like to know the truth if they were themselves had been diagnosed with 
terminal illness, the great majority said they would want to know. A survey conducted in 
2004 among 180 nurses in Shandong in Northeast coastal China showed that, when 
imagining themselves as patients, they would prefer to be informed even though, as medical 
professionals, they would hesitate to tell the truth to their own patients (Zhu 2005, 73). When 
the nurses put themselves in their patients’ shoes, the overwhelming majority of them, 
92.6%, preferred to know the diagnosis and prognosis of severe and terminal illness. 
However, when asked whether they as nurses should inform their patients about their 
adverse medical conditions, 71.6% said that they would withhold the truth. When asked to 
imagine themselves as patients’ family members, only 2.5% would speak directly and 
immediately, 69.1% would choose to tell the truth after prevaricating for a time, and 28.4% 
would not disclose the condition in any circumstances (Ibid). A survey of 634 doctors and 
nurses, conducted in Wuhan, again illustrates that  medical professionals are reluctant to 
speak candidly about cancer; that patients are aware of that they have insufficient 
knowledge about their medical condition; and that physicians are inclined to let family 
members, rather than patients, make important decisions (Zeng, Li, Chen, and Fang 2007).  
As presented in the second section of this chapter, there are signs that the attitudes of 
mainland Chinese medical professionals are changing. In 2009, lecturing to a class of 50 
medical students at Peking University Health Science Centre, a leading medical school in 
China located in Beijing, I asked the class whether they would tell patients about their 
diagnosis and prognosis of terminal illness. The great majority answered “yes” by raising 
their hands.    
Other surveys confirm the disparity between patients’ wishes on the one hand and the 
reluctance of family members on the other. In a survey of 175 patients and 238 family 
members visiting a hospital clinic in Beijing (He, Wang, Tian, Zhou and Wang 2009), 42% of 
patients wanted to be told immediately after a diagnosis of cancer was confirmed, 31.4% 
wanted both patients and family members to be told together, and 26.3% preferred that only 
family members be informed. However, only 2.1% of family members wanted the diagnosis 
to be communicated directly to the patient – although 16.4% wanted both patients and 
family members to be told. The contrasts in this survey are stark: whereas nearly three 
quarters of patients wanted to be informed, either alone or with family members, more than 
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three quarters of family members preferred that doctors inform them alone. In another 
survey of 194 family members of recently diagnosed and hospitalized cancer patients, 57.7% 
disagreed and 42.3% agreed that patients should be told (Sun, Li, Sun and Chang 2007). A 
further survey of 382 patients and 482 relatives in Chengdu, Southwestern China, indicates 
that cancer patients were more likely than family members to believe that patients should be 
informed (early stage, 90.8% vs 69.9%; terminal stage, 60.5% vs 34.4%) and that most 
participants preferred being told immediately after the diagnosis (Jiang, Li and Li et al. 
2007).   
One ethical question that arises from the disagreement between patients, their families, and 
health care providers, disclosed by these studies is – what should be done when patients 
want to know about their condition but medical professionals and relatives prefer to 
withhold information and even lie to them? In Chinese culture, the Golden Rule taught by 
Confucius is widely known and respected: “Do not impose on others what you do not wish 
for yourself” (jishuo buyu, wushi yuren). If the general preference of Chinese people for 
knowing the truth about terminal illness is interpreted as a wish not be lied to or to remain 
in ignorance, then, according to the Golden Rule, it is ethically unacceptable for medical 
professionals and relatives to impose on patients what they consider to be in the patients’ 
best interests, regardless of what patients themselves prefer.     
Another ethical question arises over the significant proportion of patients who prefer not to 
know about their prognosis. The short answer is that one should not impose the unpalatable 
truth upon this group. To ignore the wish not to know is as wrong as dismissing the desire 
to know. Perhaps pre-diagnosis informed consent is required to address this.  
6. Harms done by secrecy and untruthfulness  
As Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilyich and Solzhenitsyn’s Cancer Ward so vividly illustrate, 
patients can often sense the seriousness of their illness even though both medical 
professionals and relatives strive to keep the truth from them. My own experience as an 
intern at a Chinese county hospital in the 1980s confirms the reality of this instinctive 
awareness of their condition by patients. In fact, a major practical difficulty of hiding the 
truth in these circumstances is that it is almost impossible to carry out successfully. Humans 
communicate with each other not only through language, but also through their social 
context, body language, and by many other means. The specialised wards and hospitals that 
patients find themselves in, and the gestures of medical professionals, relatives and friends 
can easily reveal the truth, despite all efforts to hide it. For the patients concerned, whatever 
others may tell them, the secrecy surrounding their treatment reveals a truth of paramount 
importance – their illness is serious.   
Even if it were feasible to hide the truth from patients, the practice of nondisclosure—the 
norm in China today—should be reversed because it is harmful to patients. On the one 
hand, the advocates of nondisclosure have offered no compelling evidence of its benefits for 
patients or their families. On the other hand, they often downplay or ignore the enormous 
harm that the practice of nondisclosure and evasion has caused to patients, families, the 
medical profession, and society at large. In addition to dismissing patients’ wish to know, 
the practice of nondisclosure increases the feelings of abandonment of those suffering from 
terminal illness and undermines the bonds of social trust, in particular those between 
patients and medical professionals.  
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For the cultural differences argument, the ethical rationale for disclosure turns on the 
question of individual rights and personal autonomy. The norm of medical truth-telling is 
thus arguably not applicable to those societies and cultures where the language of 
individual rights and autonomy is largely absent. It is true that, politically, the shift from 
nondisclosure to disclosure that occurred in most Western countries around the 1970s had a 
great deal to do with the patients’ rights movement. And, in bioethics, disclosure and 
informed consent are often theoretically justified out of respect for the patient’s autonomy, a 
leading principle in the discipline. However, it is a mistake to regard the ethical rationale for 
direct disclosure as wholly based on the notions of individual rights and autonomy. There 
are other sound ethical reasons for direct disclosure—for instance, the principle of 
beneficence, a fundamental value for almost every healing system and medical ethics 
tradition worldwide.  
Although often overlooked in cross-cultural discussions of truth-telling and informed 
consent, a major factor in the historical shift toward disclosure in the West was the practical 
necessity for effective (but not overly aggressive) therapeutic intervention. Jay Katz’s The 
Silent World of Doctor and Patient, a classic of bioethics, has highlighted this crucial point. The 
practice of truth-telling and informed consent is grounded not only in the principle of 
autonomy or self-determination, but also in good therapeutic management in face of the 
problem of uncertainty in medicine and the new challenges that have arisen in caring for 
seriously ill and dying patients. Nondisclosure and untruthfulness are not ethically 
justifiable because “[t]he iatrogenic deprivation of information makes a powerful 
contribution to patients’ sense of abandonment.” (Ibid, 212) 
Doctors’ ready retreat behind silence—apparent to patients by doctors’ demeanor when 
they keep most of their thoughts to themselves, deprive patients of vital information, or pat 
patients on the back and assure them that everything will be all right and they need not 
worry—makes patients feel disregarded, ignored, patronized, and dismissed. (Ibid, 209-210) 
In the words of two other authors, “Tacitly to impose silence, denial, deception, and 
isolation upon the dying patient may itself cause suffering and bring about bereavement of 
the dying, a state of premortem loneliness, emotional abandonment, and withdrawn 
interest” (cited in Katz 2002: 222). The practice of nondisclosure thus serves medical 
professionals’ interests more than those of patients. Disclosure and informed consent, on the 
other hand, “seek to protect patients from the ravages and pain of abandonment” (Ibid, 208).   
In the late nineteenth century, Tolstoy imaginatively rendered the detrimental effects of 
lying to the patient with terminal illness: 
Ivan Ilyich suffered most of all from the lie, the lie, for some reason, everyone accepted, 
that he was not dying but was simply ill, and that if he stayed calm and underwent 
treatment he could expect good results. Yet he knew that regardless of what was done, 
all he could expect was more agonizing suffering and death. And he was tortured by 
this lie, tortured by the fact that they refused to acknowledge what he and everyone else 
knew, that they wanted to lie about his horrible condition and to force him to become a 
part of that lie. This lie, a lie perpetrated on the eve of his death, a lie that was bound to 
degrade the awesome, solemn act of his dying to the level of their social calls, their 
draperies, and the sturgeon they ate for dinner, was an excruciating torture for Ivan 
Ilyich. And, oddly enough, many times when they were going through their acts with 
him he came within a hairbreadth of shouting: “Stop your lying! You and I know that 
I’m dying, so at least stop lying!” (Tolstoy 1981, 102-103) 
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Acknowledging to patients the seriousness of their medical condition may not be caring or 
healing in itself (although one could argue that it is), but it is at least the starting point for 
any good caring and healing regime. Medical professionals and other caregivers may lack 
the power to truly relieve the suffering of gravely ill and dying patients, but, as Ivan Ilyich 
urged, they can “at least stop lying”.  
Those who defend the practice of nondisclosure in China may contest that Chinese patients 
do not feel the abandonment, loneliness and agony that Ivan Ilyich or Western patients 
experienced when deprived of critical medical information. But, unless convincing empirical 
evidence is provided for this imagined cultural difference, one must assume that Chinese 
patients do not differ radically from their counterparts in the West in this regard.  
The major concern in contemporary China, as in the West a few decades ago, is that open 
and direct disclosure may harm patients. Yet, in Western countries where medical truth-
telling has now become firmly established it has been shown that concerns over the 
presumed psychological and physical harms to patients are in most cases unfounded. And it 
need hardly be said that such paternalistic attitudes seriously underestimate the intelligence, 
resilience and resolve of patients suffering from terminal illness in dealing with the realities 
of death and dying.   
Lying has a further serious detrimental effect – the harm done to the patient-physician 
relationship. Social trust is the foundation of any good communal life. Lying to patients 
undermines their trust in medical professionals, just as lying in public life does lethal 
damage to the sustaining and nourishing of social trust. So nondisclosure and 
untruthfulness can hardly be justified by either “individualistic” or “communitarian” 
values. 
7. The question of family  
As we have seen, a key element of the cultural difference view that defends the Chinese 
practice of nondisclosure stems from a highly legitimate and important concern – the 
interests and integrity of the family. However, a number of the assumptions and assertions 
involved in defending this concern are empirically problematic and ethically misleading. 
Although detailed discussion of the role of the family in relation to bioethics from a 
Chinese-Western comparative perspective needs much more space, I wish to at least raise a 
few questions on the subject here.  
Firstly, based on the popular dichotomy of China and the West as “radical others”, the 
cultural differences argument posits a cross-cultural distinction, asserting that the family is 
central or even unique in Chinese culture but not so in the West. Those who would make 
this assertion are very selective and arbitrary in their choice ofcultural traditions within 
China and the West. Several major Chinese schools of thought and socio-political 
movements such as Daoism, Moism, the New Culture Movement in the early twentieth 
century and Chinese socialism – both in its ideology and in its political-economic system – 
have all challenged the primacy of the family. At the same time, the essential role of the 
family in Western civilization (e.g., in Judeo-Christian tradition) as well as in Western 
bioethics has very often been downplayed and even dismissed. The truth is that, both as an 
essential social institution and as a cardinal moral value, the family has always been a vital 
element of any society or culture, whether in the East or in the West.   
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Secondly, the practice of nondisclosure in China has been attributed to the value placed by 
Confucianism on the primacy of the family. Yet, as I showed elsewhere (Nie 2011), the well-
established Chinese tradition of open and direct disclosure on medical matters was 
endorsed by one of the key Confucian moral ideals, that of cheng (truthfulness, sincerity).  
 Thirdly and most importantly, the argument about the family assumes that the practice of 
nondisclosure or indirect disclosure is more beneficial to the family than that of direct 
disclosure. However, there is no empirical evidence to support this. Secrecy and lying can be 
very harmful to family relationships as vividly portrayed, once again, in Tolstoy’s Death of 
Ivan Illich. On the contrary, a strong case can be made that direct disclosure may better serve 
families affected, and family values, in than nondisclosure and deceit.  
Drawing on the classic work of Sissela Bok (1989 [1978]), who condemns deception in public 
life, including lying to dying patients, as both ethically unjustifiable and practically harmful, 
some Western scholars have challenged the “cultural difference” view of truth-telling to the 
sick and dying in the Chinese context (e.g. Wear 2007). Still, we are warned to “studiously 
avoid presuming to take a firm stand” on lobbying for truth-telling as a general rule in Chinese 
society because the available data allegedly do not give a clear picture on two crucial points at 
the heart of the realted ethical dilemma: what Chinese patients typically want, and whether 
medical truth-telling will undermine the traditional Chinese family (Ibid).  
However, as discussed above, we do have reliable data on the preference of the majority of 
Chinese to know the truth about terminal illness. As for the relationship between truth-
telling and the family, the practice of direct disclosure in the West over the past several 
decades suggests that disclosure in itself does not necessarily harm the family as a social 
institution or as a locus of moral value. Truth-telling can empower family members to better 
support dying patients, attend to the needs and wellbeing of their loved ones, and diminish 
the feelings of abandonment and loneliness experienced by their suffering relative. In such 
difficult times when, as a Chinese saying expresses it, the whole family suffers if a single 
member is in pain (yiren xiangyu, mandang bule), truth-telling can strengthen, rather than 
weaken, the bonds of love and interdependence among family members.     
8. The Confucian morality of truthfulness and its ethical implication for 
medical practice   
The contemporary Chinese practice of non-disclosure or indirect disclosure has been 
presented and argued to be justifiable and preferable according to Confucianism (e.g. Fan 
and Li 2004). However, this interpretation of Confucianism is historically groundless (see 
Nie 2011: Chapter 6) and normatively wrong and misleading. In other words, the 
contemporary dominant – though challenged – practice in China cannot be justified by the 
ethical principles and ideals of major Chinese moral, political and spiritual traditions such 
as Confucianism.  
In Confucianism, the highest moral ideals or principles are ren (humanity, humaneness), yi 
(righteousness) and li (the correct performance of rites), although scholars disagree about 
which has primacy (for a discussion of Confucian professional ethics of medicine, see Nie 
2011: Chapters 11 and 12). While chengxin (truthfulness, honesty, trustworthiness or 
sincerity), another virtue highly regarded in Confucianism, is often used as a single phrase 
in modern Chinese, in classical Chinese cheng and xin are two closely related but different 
concepts, especially in Confucian tradition. Confucius himself discussed xin frequently in 
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the Analects. While it rarely appears in the Analects, cheng is a key term in Neo-Confucianism 
and in other two Confucian classics, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Means.  
The necessity of acquiring xin is a major theme in the Analects. According to a contemporary 
Chinese scholar, the term – meaning honesty, faithfulness and truthfulness – appears at least 
24 times in the “Bible of China” (Yang1980, 257). The other fundamental Confucian concepts 
of ren, li and yi appear 108, 74, and 24 times in the Analects respectively (Ibid, 221, 311, 291). 
Since the early Han Dynasty (c. the 2nd century BCE) when Confucianism was established as 
the official ideology of the state, xin has been regarded as the fifth of the Five Cardinal 
Virtues (wuchang) of Confucianism. Confucius used the metaphor of the yoke or horse 
harness to illustrate the importance of honesty and truthfulness for both individuals and 
social life (II, 23):   
The Master said, “I do not know how a man without truthfulness is to get on. How can a 
large carriage be made to go without the cross-bar for yoking the oxen to, or a small carriage 
without the arrangement for yoking the horses?” (Legge 1971 [1893], 153) 
Confucius placed a very high value on xin, stating that “No human being can stand without 
truthfulness” (XII, 7) and, in The Great Learning (III, 3), “In communication with people, he 
[ie, the truthful person] abides in faithfulness.”   
While the term cheng (sincerity, authenticity or truthfulness) is rarely mentioned in the 
Analects, it is a crucial concept in other Confucian classics and for Confucianism in general. 
The term embodies a complex nexus of metaphysical, ethical, psychological, and spiritual 
meanings, as the following quote from The Doctrine of the Mean (XX, 18) indicates: 
Sincerity [truthfulness] is the way of Heaven. The attainment of sincerity is the way of men. 
He who possesses sincerity, is he who, without an effort, hits what is right, and apprehends, 
without the exercise of thought; – he is the sage who naturally and easily embodies the right 
way. He who attains to sincerity, is he who chooses what is good, and firmly holds it fast. 
(Legge 1971[1893], 413; emphasis original)   
Philosophically, this passage is comparable to Kant’s discussion of “the good will”. Still, 
however sophisticated the ramifications of the term may be, at the most basic level, like xin, 
cheng equates to one of the most fundamental moral maxims endorsed by most if not all 
human societies and ethical systems: be honest and, at the very least, do not deceive.   
It is important  to point out that, while the ethical principle of truthfulness is essential for 
Confucianism, this value is not absolute. In certain situations, concealing the truth is 
certainly an acceptable course, even a praiseworthy one. According to a story in the Analects 
(XIII, 18): 
The duke of Sheh [Ye], informed Confucius, saying, “Among us here there are those who 
may be styled upright [or just] in their conduct. If their father has stolen a sheep, they will 
bear witness to the fact.”  
Confucius said, “Among us, in our part of the country, those who are upright are different 
from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the 
misconduct of the father. Uprightness [or justice] is to be found in this.” (Legge 1971 [1893], 
270).  
In one of the early dialogues of Plato, Euthyphro, Socrates challenged a similar belief that it is 
right to indict one’s father for committing manslaughter. Many commentators, ancient, 
modern and contemporary, have debated the rationale behind the position taken by 
Confucius here. For the purposes of our discussion, the point is that, in striking contrast to 
Kant’s deontological ethics, truthfulness is not an absolute value in Confucianism. 
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What are the implications of the Confucian morality of truthfulness for medical practice 
regarding whether medical professionals should tell the patients the dire diagnosis and 
prognosis? First and foremost, as a general maxim for medical practice, healthcare 
professionals should abide by truthfulness as strictly as they can, following the consensus 
established by traditional Chinese medical ethics over the centuries. To deceive patients for 
motives of personal gain is always absolutely wrong and morally corrupt. Even when 
delivering painful news, as in the diagnosis and prognosis of terminal illness, truthfulness 
should not be easily set aside and medical practitioners should practice open and direct 
disclosure as a general rule, following the norm of the ancient Chinese medical sages. 
Moreover, following the example of the systematic modern Chinese text on the professional 
ethics of medicine (Nie 2011: Chapter 6), a careful distinction should be made between lying 
(or deception) and concealing the truth. Ethically, there is a subtle but significant difference 
between these two; in the words of a Chinese idiom, “an error the breadth of a single hair 
can lead someone astray by a thousand miles”.  
The principle of truthfulness should be breached only in exceptional circumstances, such as 
when complete candour would lead to serious danger for the patient, such as confirmed risk 
of suicide due to breaking bad news. For Confucian medical ethics the highest ideal is ren, as 
articulated in the ethical definition of healing: “medicine as the art of humanity or 
humaneness”. Nevertheless, the burden of proof should fall on those who believe that the 
principle of open and direct disclosure should be breached in order to avoid perceived risks 
to the patient. I have presented overwhelming evidence in this chapter that the great 
majority of Chinese patients want information about their medical condition. And we have 
seen that a conspiracy of silence or outright deception by family members and medical 
professionals can do great harm to patients. So those cases in which the truth needs to be 
concealed are likely to be rare. Cases where patients need to be deceived should be even 
rarer.   
Yet, while most Chinese patients would prefer to know the truth about their medical 
condition, there is still a significant proportion of patients who prefer to be kept in ignorance 
about their prognosis. This raises a moral question as well as a medical challenge. As 
mentioned in Section 5, the short answer is that one should not impose the unpalatable truth 
upon this group; and to ignore a patient’s wish not to know is as wrong as dismissing their 
legitimate desire to know. From a cross-cultural perspective, patients who subscribe to the 
“ignorance is bliss” mentality can be found not only in China but also in the West. On this 
point, it is also worth pointing out that, as far as Confucianism is concerned, the concept of 
cheng includes a criticism and even a condemnation of self-deception.  
The radical level of disagreement revealed in the hospital survey results cited above 
provides evidence of a genuine moral dilemma for contemporary Chinese: that is, as 
discussed at the end of Section 5, what should be done when patients want to know the 
truth about their condition but medical professionals and relatives prefer to withhold 
information and even lie to them? According to the Golden Rule in Confucianism, “Do not 
impose on others what you do not wish for yourself,” medical professionals should not 
obstruct the wish of patients in order to achieve what they believe to be in the best interest 
of patients.  
Placing the onus of disclosure on family members in cases of terminal illness, a practice 
that is widespread in China and favourably endorsed by the advocates of the cultural 
differences argument, raises additional ethical questions. For instance, is this really in the 
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patient’s best interests, or for the convenience of medical professionals? Telling patients 
the truth about their serious condition is an art; however caring and experienced he or she 
may be, no physician will be perfect at this. As the 1847 Code of Ethics of the American 
Medical Association recommends, it is not ethically sound for physicians to delegate this 
difficult task wholly to family members. Apart from their obvious lack of systematic 
training in medicine and counselling, most importantly, lay relatives may lack the 
necessary professional and personal distance often critical for imparting sensitive 
information in an empathic way. Chinese medical professionals need to change their 
practice on this. Shunning a professional duty merely because of its difficulty is 
unacceptable, ethically and professionally. If the real motivation for “familist” practice is 
simply the convenience of medical professionals, then the practice clearly needs reform. 
For Chinese medical practitioners, the basic requirement of the Confucian medical ideal, 
“medicine as the art of humanity”, is to fulfil their professional duties, however 
challenging they may be. 
9. The tyranny of culture vs. the primacy of morality  
Respecting perceived cultural differences constitutes a major ethical stumbling block to 
implementing the practice of direct and truthful medical disclosure in non-Western 
societies (and non-European groups within Western countries). By this logic, the current 
mainstream cultural practice is proffered as a sufficient ethical rationale to reject medical 
truth-telling. In other words, the “cultural difference” proponents attempt to bypass the 
moral difficulties involved by substituting statements about cultural practices for serious 
ethical examination. In this age of Western cultural hegemony, it is extremely important 
to respect different cultural practices, especially non-Western ones. However, an ethical 
dilemma arises when cultural practices conflict with moral imperatives. The cultural 
difference argument privileges cultural practices over ethical mandates; it implies, if not 
holds, that whatever is culturally authentic is automatically ethically defensible. This 
tyranny of culture over ethics can easily lead to moral relativism and even ethical 
nihilism. According to the logic of the cultural difference view, slavery in human history; 
gender discrimination and many other forms of discrimination, which are found in almost 
all human societies; the West’s colonization of the non-Western world; the Third Reich in 
Germany; and foot-binding in Chinese history – to list just a few examples – are all 
ethically justifiable because all these practices were or still are culturally genuine and even 
unique.   
More crucially, respecting cultural norms and practices can actually work against the 
fundamental values of a given culture and society. For both Confucianism and Daoism, the 
two major indigenous Chinese moral and political traditions, it is not existing cultural 
practices that should be privileged, but whatever is morally right. For Confucianism and 
Daoism, the most fundamental value is precisely the primacy of ethics and morality over 
existing social and cultural practices, rather than the other way around. The moral 
imperative of the Dao (Tao, literally “the Way”) or the Tianming (the mandate of Heaven) is 
superior to the claims of any cultural and social practices, whether Western or Eastern. The 
basic task and highest calling of ethics is, first of all, to identify which socio-cultural 
practices are morally justifiable and which are not.  
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Taking a universalist ethical position on human rights and patients’ rights, other bioethicists 
have forcefully argued the importance of truth-telling and informed consent internationally, 
in China as well (Macklin 1999). This may be seen as a kind of outside perspective. In this 
paper, my stance is from the inside out.  
My aim is not to dispute the existence of widely acknowledged cultural differences in China 
and the West regarding medical truth-telling. Rather, the key question for me is how this 
prima facie cultural difference—direct disclosure vs. non-disclosure or indirect disclosure—should be 
interpreted historically, sociologically and ethically. In particular, I have demonstrated that, 
despite its popularity and apparent plausibility, the cultural differences argument against 
medical truth-telling in China is seriously flawed at both the descriptive and normative 
levels. It has oversimplified and distorted both the historical and socio-cultural realities, 
including the role of family, in both China and the West. It has mis-presented and mis-
interpreted the standpoints of such major Chinese traditions as Confucianism on the subject. 
Historically, it has ignored the venerable Chinese tradition of direct truth-telling and, 
sociologically, it has dismissed the wishes of the great majority of Chinese patients who 
want to know the truth about their prospects. Ethically, it has obscured critical moral 
problems involved in nondisclosure and deception by medical professionals, and it 
promotes the tyranny of existing socio-cultural practices over ethics and acceptable 
morality.  
Therefore, the contemporary Chinese practice of concealing the truth and even lying to 
patients about their terminal illness, no matter how widespread, ought to be critically 
examined, vigorously challenged, and systematically reformed. Culturally, the shift toward 
honest and direct disclosure now occurring in China is not so much –or at least not just- 
following a Western pathway, but constitutes a return to a neglected indigenous tradition (for 
a detailed discussion of this forgotten Chinese tradition, see Nie 2011, Chapter 6). More 
importantly, even if it were proven to be culturally alien to China as universally assumed, the 
norm of truth-telling should be instituted on the basis of the ethical imperatives presented in 
this paper.    
As for cross-cultural bioethics, if I have appeared to argue that all cultures are 
fundamentally the same and that cultural differences do not matter, I would like to say 
that this is not my intention. My point is that Chinese and Western cultures are different, 
but not in the ways suggested by popular stereotypes, not in the sense of their being 
“radical others” to one another. As this study of medical truth-telling in China and other 
research projects have illustrated, Chinese-Western cultural differences are far more 
complicated, subtle, intriguing – and thus more difficult to grasp and articulate – than 
facile overgeneralizations. Rather than being homogenous and static, Chinese culture, like 
any other human culture, has always been internally heterogeneous, full of contradictory 
elements, changing over time, influenced by and borrowing elements from foreign 
cultures, open to new possibilities, and subject to ethical scrutiny and developing moral 
ideals. The complexity of cultural differences as indicated in medical truth-telling in 
China in comparison with the West calls for a more adequate cross-cultural bioethics or a 
“transcultural bioethics”: an ethics that resists cultural stereotypes, cherishes the common 
humanity, upholds the primacy of morality, and acknowledges the richness, internal 
diversity, dynamism and openness of medical ethics in every culture, whether in China, 
www.intechopen.com
The “Cultural Differences” Argument and Its 
Misconceptions: The Return of Medical Truth-Telling in China 
 
117 
the West or elsewhere (for these general points, see Nie 2005, 2007, 2009, and especially 
2011). 
11. A Personal note  
I would like to end this paper on a personal note. In the late 1980s, the father of a former 
medical school classmate and good friend of mine was suffering the final stages of lung 
cancer. A psychiatrist himself, without any knowledge of the new practice of disclosure in 
the West, my friend informed his father of the diagnosis and prognosis – something his 
father’s doctors and nurses never did. In taking this step, my friend set out bravely in 
defiance of the dominant social and medical norm of nondisclosure, and unknowingly 
travelled a way that ancient Chinese medical sages had walked more than twenty 
centuries ago. At the time, I should have questioned him further about his courageous 
decision to choose this unorthodox route. But our discussions were kept brief – after all, it 
is never easy to talk about the death of a loved one. Now it has become impossible for me 
to continue the dialogue. Having just celebrated his 31th birthday, and when working as a 
visiting physician in Japan in 1994, my friend was hit by a car while riding a bicycle and 
died from his injuries.  
This paper is humbly dedicated to Dr Zou Xinxin (1963-1994), a brilliant physician and 
friend. If only I could have had the benefit of his endorsement and criticism. 
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